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TPO INC. v. McMILLEN: THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE
AND THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER
INTRODUCTION

A corollary to the concept of separation of power in our
federal system of government is the principle that judicial
power should be exercised by an independent judiciary.' Since
such power may have its genesis either in article I or article III
of the Constitution, it is necessary, from a constitutional standpoint, to recognize the derivative source of power exercised by
officials acting in a judicial capacity. 2 Moreover, the question
remains whether the exercise of this power is limited to those
officials who qualify under the standards established by either
article.
This note will examine the new Federal Magistrate Act 3
in regard to the issue of the exclusive exercise of judicial power.
4
The recent seventh circuit decision of TPO Inc. v. McMillen
affirms the exercise of the adjudicating function of a federal
district judge, and limits the application of the Federal Magistrate Act by holding that it is not an implemental instrument for
the abdication of that function by the district court.

TPO CASE
TPO was a corporate defendant in a case pending before
the district court. During the course of that proceeding, TPO
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Since affidavits were attached, however, the court treated the motion as one for summary judgment. At a status report hearing, plaintiff's counsel expressed
concern over the slow pace of the pretrial proceedings and
pressed for a spring trial date, since his client was of advanced
age and in ill health. The district court judge noted that the
hearing of motions was delayed and issued a reference order to
a magistrate, pursuant to the district court rule and Magistrate
1 In O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, at 530
Court said:

(1933)

the

The Constitution, in distributing the powers of government, creates

three distinct and separate departments -

the legislative, the executive,

and the judicial. This separation is not merely a matter of convenience
or governmental mechanism. Its object is basic and vital, namely, ...
to preclude a commingling of these essentially different powers of government in the same hands.
See MENTOR, FEDERALIST PAPERS (8th ed. 1961) Hamilton's discussion
of the judiciary in numbers 78 and 79.
2 U.S. CONST. art. I and art. III.
3 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39 (1968).
4 TPO v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972).
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Act.5 At the time the reference order was entered, no other
motion or contested matter was pending in the case. TPO moved
to vacate the reference order arguing that the magistrate was
without power to rule on a motion to dismiss. The district court
denied the motion, and pursuant to the reference order, the magistrate denied TPO's motion to dismiss. TPO then sought to
have the appeals court issue a writ of mandamus to expunge the
order assigning the motion to the magistrate.
The questioning of the federal magistrate's power raised
two vital issues: first, whether a federal district court judge
could constitutionally delegate power to a magistrate for the
purpose of ruling upon either a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment; and, secondly, whether the magistrate had the
jurisdiction to exercise this delegated power.6 The court in TPO
held that the district court judge lacked the power to delegate
such duties to a magistrate, and that the magistrate was not
empowered to exercise ultimate adjudicating or decision making
power. 7
Glidden v. Zdanoc
A constitutional limitation on the exercise of judicial power
by officials acting in a judicial capacity must be dependent upon
the source of the judicial power being exercised. Article III
provides that Justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE -

5 28 U.S.C. §636(b) (1968) which provides:
Any district court of the United States, by the concurrence of a majority
of all of the judges of such district court, may establish rules pursuant
to which any full-time United States magistrate, or, where there is no
full-time magistrate reasonably available, any part-time magistrate
specially designated by the court, may be assigned within the territorial
jurisdiction of such court such additional duties as are not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States. The additional
duties authorized by rule may include, but are not restricted to (1) service as a special master in an appropriate civil action,
pursuant to the applicable provisions of this title and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District
Courts;
(2) assistance to a district judge in the conduct of pretrial or
discovery proceedings in civil or criminal actions; and
(3) preliminary review of applications for post trial relief made
by individuals convicted of criminal offenses, and submission
of a report and recommendations to facilitate the decision
of the district judge having jurisdiction over the case as to
whether there should be a hearing.
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has adopted
these "Magistrate Rules":
1(c)
The magistrate shall perform the following additional duties
upon direction of a Judge approved by order of the Executive
Committee.
(b)
assist Judges in conducting pre-trial proceedings in a civil case.
2 (2) (b) An appeal from a judicial order entered by a Magistrate shall
be filed within twenty (20) days with the Judge who referred
the matter to a Magistrate.
6 Note 4 supra at 350.
7TPO v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 at 359 (1972). Quoting the Court in
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inferior courts retain their positions at an undiminished salary
during good behavior., However, while article III constitutes
the apparent source of judicial power, the Supreme Court had
quite early recognized that authority to act in a judicial capacity

could be found in sources existing outside that provision.9 In
American Insurance Co. v. Canter,1 for example, the question

presented to the Court concerned the jurisdiction of a Florida
territorial court over matters of admiralty. Adjudication of the
case was conducted by judges who served only four-year terms,

thus not complying with the constitutional mandate of article
III. In sustaining the territorial court's power to hear admiralty matters, Chief Justice John Marshall stated:
These courts, then, are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial power conferred by the constitution on the general government,
can be deposited .... They are legislative courts, created in virtue

of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government
.... The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part
of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the constitution, but is conferred by congress, in the execution of those
general powers which that body possesses over the territories of
the United States."

Through this pronouncement, future courts began to distin12
guish between legislative and constitutional courts.

The Supreme Court in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok'3 interpreted and discussed the dichotomy between legislative and
LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 at 256 (1957), this analogy was
drawn: "We find that the order of reference here was lacking in power and,
amounted to little less than an abdication of the judicial function depriving
the parties of a trial before the court on the basic issues involved in the
litigation."
8 U.S. CONST. art. III §1. Constitutionally the judicial power of the
federal government is vested in "[o]ne supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
Further, Judges of the Supreme Court and inferior courts established in
light of this provision should retain their position at an undiminished salary
during good behavior.
9American Insurance Company et al. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511.
The source of authority was the U.S. CONST. art. I §8: "To constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court."
10 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511.

11 Id. at 545.

12 The basis of the distinction is the expanded function which could be
performed by legislative courts, such as the giving of advisory opinions,
prohibited to article III courts. See Keller v. Potomac Electric Co., 261
U.S. 428, Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, City of Panama, 101 U.S.
453, Clinton v. Engleheckt, 13 Wall. 434, McAllister v. United States, 141
U.S. 174. In 1 OHLINGER FEDERAL PRACTICE §1, the author quotes from
Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), wherein the court stated:
rT]he power of congress to create courts is dependent upon the existence
of the constitution. The question then is was there an applicable
provision from which the power exercised by congress could be shown
to be operative. The question of an existing power source is not limited
to the judiciary.
See also United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp.. 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
Youngstown v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 597 (1952).
13370 U.S. 530 (1962).
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constitutional courts. Two cases were presented to the Glidden
Court, both concerning the constitutional exercise of judicial
power by judges of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
and of the Court of Claims. In accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§293(a), a judge of the Court of Claims was designated to sit
upon a circuit court appellate panel. Similarly, under 28 U.S.C.
§294(d), a retired judge of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals was assigned to sit as a district court judge. The
petitioners in both cases challenged the appointment alleging
that they were denied the protection of adjudication by independent judges of article III status, notably paralleling the
contention of the petitioner in TPO regarding the magistrate's
exercise of judicial power. 4 The petitioners relied upon the
Supreme Court's decisions in Ex parte Bakelite Corp.'5 and
Williams v. United States,16 wherein the Court had held that
neither the Court of Claims nor the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals were to be considered article III courts. The Glidden
Court reversed both Williams and Bakelite and held that both
the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals were article III courts, observing:
The distinction referred to in those cases between 'constitutional'
and 'legislative' courts has been productive of much confusion and
controversy. Because of the highly theoretical nature of the problem in its present context we would be well advised to decide these
cases on narrower grounds if any are fairly available ....11
The confusion and controversy referred to by Glidden
proceeded from two sources: the article III limitation on the
exercise of judicial power to "cases and controversies,"1' while
legislative courts had never been limited by this mandate in
exercising judicial power; and, the uncertainty in determining
the true status of a particular court as evidenced by the reasoning in Bakelite, Williams, and O'Donoghue v. United States."
This uncertainty was present in TPO where, although the status
of the official was known to the Court, the effect of that status
upon his exercise of power was yet to be determined.
In both Bakelite and Williams, the Court rested its decision
on the fact that neither the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals nor the Court of Claims included in its jurisdiction any14 Note 4 supra.

15 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
16 289 U.S. 553 (1933).
17 Note 13 at 534, supra.
ISEx parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 at 445 (1929) ; note 16 at 549
supra. See 1 OHLINGER FEDERAL PRACTICE §1 citing Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46 (1907) where it was said of judicial power: "it may be observed that
the judicial power of a nation extends to all controversies justiciable in their
nature, the parties to which or the property involved in which may be reached
by judicial process."
19 289 U.S. 516 (1933). See p. 168 infra.
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thing which "inherently or necessarily required judicial determination. 20° Bakelite attempted to distinguish between legislative matters involving mere judicial interpretations and those
involving judicial controversies. 21 In Williams, the Court recognized that judicial power was being exercised by legislative
courts, although not the judicial power envisioned by article

111.22

In O'Donoghue v. United States,2 3 decided the same day as

Williams, the issue was whether the judges of the superior
courts of the District of Columbia were of article III or article
I stature.

The O'Donoghue Court held that those courts were

article III despite their exercise of functions prohibited to other
article III courts.24 The O'Donoghue Court justified its decision by concluding that the existence of judicial power in the
courts of the District of Columbia was derived from both article III and article I of the United States Constitution.25
Both Bakelite and Williams were criticized in the voluminous commentaries following their decisions for creating the

theoretical confusion which then caused the Glidden Court to
re-examine this area of the law, 26 the heart of which was the
true effect of designating a court as legislative or constitu27
tional.
Glidden's Answer to Legislative-Constitutional Dilemma

Presented with this legislative-constitutional enigma, the
Note 13 supra at 549. Both courts could have been legislative courts
and were treated as such.
21 Note 13 supra at 548 quoting Bakelite: "Legislative courts also may
be created as special tribunals to examine and determine various matters,
arising between the government and others which from their nature do
not require determination and yet are susceptible of it."
22 Note 16 supra at 567, 571, 578. In addition the Williams court
reached a curious conclusion in interpreting the clause "controversies to
which the United States shall be a party," U.S. CONST. art. III § 1). The court
examined the historical context of the constitutional enactment noting that
sovereign immunity was the then accepted doctrine. Basing its decision
upon the historical context of the provision and the failure of the drafters to
include the word all as a prefix to the phrase "controversies involving the
United States," the court concluded that it was intended that suits where the
United States was a party defendant, being dependent upon statute, were outside the scope of the court's jurisdiction. But cf. Brown, The Rent in our
Judicial Armor, 10 G.W.L. REv. 127 (1941).
23 289 U.S. 516 (1933).
24 Id. at 540.
The court concluded that because Congress could exercise
power over the district courts under article III of the Constitution, those
courts could exercise the powers of legislative courts. See Keller v. Potomac
Electric Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923).
25 Id.
26 Sece Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARv. L. REv. 894 (1930);
The Judicial Power of Federal Tribunals Not Organized under Article Three,
34 COLUM. L. REV. 746 (1934) ; The Restrictive Effect of Article Three on the
Organization of Federal Courts, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 344 (1934).
27 The Judicial Power of Federal Tribunals Not Organized Under
Article Three, 34 CoLUM. L. REV. 746, 760-61 (1934) :
From this evidence it may be concluded that if a tribunal exercises
jurisdiction that might validly be given to a court, whether or not or20
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Glidden Court, in view of three possible alternatives, rendered
its decision. First, the Court could have denied article III
status to the courts in question on the ground that they exer-

cised non-judicial functions. 2

Secondly, it could have granted

article III status, based upon the predominant judicial characteristics of the courts,29 and reserve judgment on the validity
of the non-judicial functions. Finally, the Court could have held
those non-judicial functions to be void, thus recognizing those
remaining functions as constitutionally compatible with article
II.30 The majority of the Glidden Court chose the second of

the three alternatives.
Glidden emphasized the faulty premises existing in both
Bakelite and Williams and refused to follow their expansive use

of the term, legislative courts.

Moreover, the Court noted, re-

ferring to Justice Marshall's opinion in the Canter case, that
legislative courts denoted territorial courts or their equivalent,

and that subsequent decisions rested upon practical considerations of proper judicial administration during transitory periods.3 1 The Court then referred to a statement made by Justice
Curtiss in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Improvement Co. 3 2 :
[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on
them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which
congress may not bring within the cognizance
of the courts of the
3
United States, as it may deem proper. 3
Although Bakelite had adopted this statement to imply that any
court created for such a purpose should be classified as leg-

islative, Glidden rejected this interpretation and reasoned that
ganized under article three, and if Congress should vest it with the incidental power of a court, or call it a court or - what is equivalent to
calling it a court -provide a direct review to the Supreme Court, that
tribunal will be considered a court.
Katz, Federal Legislative Courts,, 43 HARV. L. REV. 894, 917 (1934).
See also HART and WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL SYSTEM,
348 (1953). The authors questioned Justice Sutherland's decision in Bakelite. They impliedly questioned the necessity for a distinction by indicating
that the effect of a judgment entered by either a legislative or constitutional
court is the same.
28 Note 12 supra for case on non-judicial duties.
29 Note 13 supra at 583.
30See The Supreme Court 1961 Term, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 160, 163,
165 (1962).
Sinder, Constitutional Law - Court of Claims and Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals are Constitutional Courts, 1962 U. ILL. L.F.
654; Potter, Constitutional Law - Federal Judiciary - Article I and III
Courts, 37 TUL. L. REV. 144 (1962).
31 See note 13 supra at 547. Referring to the historical background of
the Canter decision (the growth of the nation through the expansion of the
territory) the court said:
Justice Marshall chose neither course (rejection of an application
of tenure provision) ; conscious as ever of his responsibility to see the
Constitution work, he recognized a greater flexibility in Congress to deal
with problems arising outside the normal context of a federal system.
3259 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
331d. at 284.

170

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 6:164

if Congress could create a court for a special purpose, it did not
necessarily follow that such court must be legislative rather

than of article III stature, especially if mandatory safeguards
4

were provided.3
After further examination of the jurisdictional aspects of
both the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, Glidden made allowances for those aspects of the

jurisdiction which were of a non-article III nature, 35 holding:
[W]hether a tribunal is to be recognized as one created under Article III depends basically upon whether its establishing legislation
complies with the limitations of that article; whether, in other
words, its business is the federal business there specified and its
judges and judgments are allowed the independence there expressly
or impliedly made requisite.3 6

The true effect of the Glidden case has been difficult to
ascertain. One authority states rather categorically that the
decision nullifies the distinction between legislative and constitutional courts.3 7 This statement may have validity when faced
with a concrete implementation by Congress of the requisites
prescribed by the Glidden rule; however, the difficulty arises in
those vague cases were the Glidden requisites have not been met.

Also, the propriety of exercising judicial power over "federal
business" within the article III limitation is open to extensive
subjective interpretation. 8 Glidden, however, should not be

interpreted as abrogating the distinctions between the constitutional sources of judicial power of a judicial official3 9 Justice
Douglas emphasized this point in his dissent when he stated:
3 Note 13 at 551 supra. See Restrictive Effect of Article Three on the
Organization of Federal Courts, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 344, 345 (1934).
3 The specific area of concern were matters heard by the Court of
Claims and Customs and Patents on referral from Congress. But see
McDermott, The Court of Claims: The Nation's Conscience, 57 A.B.A.J. 594
(1971). After the Glidden case, Congress attempted to grant the Court
of Claims reference jurisdiction under limited situations. The Justice
Department rejected the statute on constitutional grounds. Ultimately
reference was to be made to a commissioner of non-article III status. See
also Kipp, A Unique National Court: The United States Court of Claims,
53 A.B.A.J. 1025 (1967).
36 Note 13 supra at 552.
37 1 OHLINGER FEDERAL PRACTICE
38 In this regard consider Justice

§2.
Brandeis' statement in Tutun v. United

States, 270 U.S. 568, 576-77 (1925) :
Whether a proceeding which results in a grant is a judicial one, does
not depend upon the nature of things granted, but upon the nature of
the proceedings which Congress has provided for securing the grant...
Whenever the law provides a remedy enforceable in the courts according
to regular course of legal procedure, and that remedy is pursued, there
arises a case within the meaning of the Constitution whether the subject
of the litigation be property or status.
31In Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 111, 143 (1969), the
constitutional issue raised by the petitioner was never passed upon by the
Court. However, both the concurring and dissenting opinions felt that the
issue should have been answered. The petitioner sought a writ of prohibition
against action taken by the Judicial Council violating his status as an independent article III judge. Justice Harlan relying upon his decision in
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"[T]he judicial function exercised by article III courts cannot
be performed by congress nor delegated to agencies under its
40
supervision and control.
If the judicial power exercised by article III courts cannot
be performed by non-article III justices and the tribunal in
question has not met the test applied in Glidden, what role can
a tribunal of that nature effectively perform within the federal
judicial system? At the heart of the Federal Magistrate Act
is this very question.
FEDERAL MAGISTRATE ACT

The Federal Magistrate Act was passed in response to a
necessary "upgrading" of the federal judicial system below the
level of the district courts.4 1 Although the statute achieved the
goal of elevating the status of the magistrate's office, 42 the TPO
Glidden stated:
If I am correct in concluding that Congress' purpose in 1939 in creating
the Judicial Councils was to rest in them, as an arm of Article III
judiciary, supervisory powers over the disposition of business in the
district courts, that purpose is not undone by a subsequent congressional
attempt to give them a minor non-judicial task; it would be perverse to
make the status of [the Councils] turn upon so miniscule a portion of
their purported functions.
Justice Black dissented, stating: "I fear that unless the action taken
by the Judicial Council in the case is in some way repudiated, the hope for
an independent judiciary will be proved to have been no more than an
evanescent dream." See also United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (1962).
40 Note 13 supra at 600.
Justice Douglas' dissent should be used to
express the protective function Article III performs for partiesin a law suit.
41 Prior to the enactment of the statute, many of the functions currently
carried on by the magistrates were performed by federal commissioners.
This commissioner system had been part of the federal judiciary from its
very inception, excercising a relatively confined role except in the area of
criminal law. However, the commissioner's role increased. Its growth was
marked with uncertainty as to the full extent of judicial power to be exercised
by the commissioner. Hearings on S. 945 before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judiciary Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 199 (1967). Peterson, The Federal Magistrate Act: A
New Dimension in the Implementation of Justice, 56 IA. L. REv. 62 (1970);
Moore, Commentary on the U.S. Judicial Code at 39, 45 (1949).
The commissioner system was marked with many shortcomings. The
commissioners themselves were not required to hold law degrees although
they might be called upon to render decisions involving complex legal
matters. The jurisdiction of the commissioner was limited. The commissioner's salary was based upon fee collections which raised constitutional
issues. In Tumoey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), the Court held that the fee
system by which a mayor collected fees for his office while acting as a magistrate, based on convictions only was violative of a defendant's due process
rights. The pecuniary interest in the outcome of the decision .was too great.
To examine the commissioner power prior to the statute enactment see
United state v. Hughes, 70 F.2d 972; Crump v. Anderson, 352 F.2d 249;
United States v. Romaneo, 241 F. Supp. 933 (1965).
42 The following passage from the Senate subcommittee report explains
the intended effect of upgrading the system:
An upgraded system of judicial officers below the level of the district
judge can provide significant advantages for the federal judicial system.
By raising the standards of the lowest judicial office and by increasing
the scope of the responsibilities that can be discharged by that office, the
system will be made capable of increasing the overall efficiency of the
federal judiciary, while at the same time providing a higher standard
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decision casts substantial doubt upon how effectively the Act
has practically assisted the efficiency of the federal judicial system.
The most significant change effected by the passage of the
Act, aside from the upgraded qualifications of the magistrate,
was the magistrate's expanded criminal4 3 and civil4 4 jurisdiction. The magistrate's criminal jurisdiction in connection with
minor offenses outside federal enclaves 45 is of particular significance when considering the effect of the reference provision
on the scope of his civil jurisdiction. In the criminal area, the
hearing before the magistrate is by the consent of both the defendant and the government, and an appeal from the magistrate's decision to the district court is provided. 46 In response
to a constitutional challenge against this provision, 47 a memorandum 41 was prepared by a Senate subcommittee staff statof justice at the point where many individuals first come into contact
with the courts.
Cong. and Ad. News 90th 2d Sess. (1968) at 4257. Hearings on S. 945,
note 43 infra. Shafarth, Off with the Old; On with the New, 55 A.B.A.J.
32 (1969).
Under 28 U.S.C.A. 631-39, substantial improvements were
made in the status of the magistrate, i.e., salaries were fixed for all part-time
magistrates and law degrees became mandatory.
43 18 U.S.C. 3401 (1968) should be read in connection with 28 U.S.C.A.
331-39.
44 28 U.S.C. §636(b) (1968).
45 18 U.S.C. 3401 (1968).
46 Id.
47 The expansion of the magistrate jurisdiction in this area raised the
very constitutional issue before the court in TPO, note 4 supra. Perhaps
one of the most interesting dialogues to occur during the hearings regarding
the constitutional question arose between Senator Tydings, chairman of the
subcommittee and Assistant Attorney General Vinson. Mr. Vinson represented the view of the Justice Department that expansion of minor offense
jurisdiction raised constitutional questions. Mr. Vinson understood the commissioner's power to hear minor offense action arising out of federal enclaves
as deriving from the congressional power to legislate as a sovereign over
federal territory. He therefore felt that the extension of the jurisdiction
would be outside the scope of the Constitution. Senator Tydings asked
rhetorically: "Now, what is judicial power? What is a referee in bankruptcy
doing when he adjudicates whether an individual is bankrupt or not, when
he adjudicates whether or not you have a proper preference or claim?" Mr.
Vinson countered by claiming such power did not arise under Article III
as would the minor offenses power of the magistrate. Senator Tydings
again distinguished between vesting power in a court rather than in an
individual with life tenure, thus avoiding the constitutional Question. The
full dialogue displays useful insight into the nature of the judiciary. Hearings on S. 945 before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judiciary Machinery
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 119 (1967).
48 Hearings on S. 945, note 41 supra. The Constitutionality of Trial of
Minor Offense by U.S. Magistrate. The article noted that the defendant
and U.S. Attorney must agree to appear before the magistrate. The right of
appeal existed to the district court judge. See also Hearings on S. 945, before
the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 258-59; letters approving of the
constitutionality of the act; Doub and Lestembaum, Federal Magistrates for
the Trial of Petty Offense Need and Constitutionality, 1107 VT. PA. L. REv.
443 at 456 (1959).
The authors note that the prior history of the courts
minor offense jurisdiction should not raise a constitutional issue. Prior
to the creation of the constitution such cases had been heard by justices in
the manner now provided for by the act. The Constitution incorporated
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ing that the statute was not creating a constitutional court,
nor was it allowing an exercise of article III adjudicating
power by a magistrate, who was in effect a mere extension
of the district court. Moreover, the safeguards specified in the
provision, namely, the consent of both parties and the right of
appeal, insured that the magistrate was acting under the umbrella of the district court. 49 The constitutional issue regarding
the magistrate's criminal jurisdiction is equally applicable" to
the magistrate's widely expanded civil jurisdiction, 51 which was
the fundamental question in TPO v. McMillen.
ANALYSIS -

TPO

The issue in TPO was whether judicial power, pursuant to
the Magistrate Act, was being exercised over federal business
within the constitutional jurisdiction of article III. The TPO
court analyzed the question presented from two perspectives:
first, by an examination of the legislative intent of the Act, and
secondly, through analogies paralleling the reference provision
with the court's judicial administrative policies and other related provisions of the Act.
The court, as earlier noted, recognized that the constitutional challenge connected with the magistrate's expanded
role in the criminal area was equally applicable to the magistrate's civil jurisdiction. Both provisions of the Act had obviously expanded the supporting role of the magistrate to the
point where the constitutional challenge was almost "inevitable." However, in the former, the court found that the legislators had emphasized the enactment of additional safeguarding legislation to insure that final disposition of the case would
always remain in the hands of an article III judge.5 2 Recognizing that these safeguards were fundamentally lacking in
cases within the magistrate's civil jurisdiction, the TPO court
declared that the reference provision was an unsuccessful legislative attempt to delegate non-delegable functions to the mag3
istrate.1
that prior practice. The good behavior provision did not alter the qualifications for conducting hearings on such matters.
4 Id. The umbrella refers to the safeguards noted in the Senate subcommittee memorandum. But cf. Representative Cahill's blistering attack
upon the extension of the magistrates' criminal jurisdiction. U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 90th Cong. 2d Sess. (1968) 4266-70.
50 Note 4 supra at 354. See also Harrisonon §945, note 41 supra. The

subcommittee noted that in upgrading the commissioner system appointment
could be made by district court judges.

Senate approval and appointment

by the President would be unwanted because there was no present intent
to set up a lower tier of article III federal judges.
9128 U.S.C. §636(b).
52 Note 49 supra.
5s Note 4 at 355, supra.
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The court further supported its decision by an analogy to
decisions in the field of judicial administration, specifically
referring to the use of special masters 4 in the federal courts.
The special master functions as an instrument for the administration of justice, 55 assisting the court in complex factual cases
such as antitrust, corporate reorganization, and infringement
actions. The master will conduct hearings, render determinations, and refer the cause to the court to make the final adjudi-

cation.

Under federal procedure reference to a special master

is the exception rather than the rule.5 6
In LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co. Inc. et al,

the Supreme

Court considered the meaning of "exceptional circumstances"
for "reference"

purposes.

The reference in LaBuy had been

premised upon the judge's crowded calendar, similar to the
situation in TPO where pretrial motion hearings had been de-

layed. The LaBuy court had emphasized the fact that the adjudicating function was vested in the district court judge and
should be abdicated only in the most limited situations; thus,

a crowded calendar was held not to be an "exceptional circumstance"5 8 justifying a constitutional reference."

The court next turned to an examination of the legislative
intent underlying the Act, particularly the reference provision.
In examining the Senate hearings, the court found it most significant that there was only a minimal amount of discussion
regarding the entire subject of the magistrate's civil jurisdiction. 0 The court then looked to the language of the reference
provision. The preliminary draft of this section contained the
following language:
[D]istrict courts may assign . . . additional powers or duties as
are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States.

Such additional powers and duties may include . . . (2)

supervision of the conduct of any pretrial discovery proceedings.
61

The final draft deleted the word "supervision" and substi54 Under the Magistrate Act a magistrate could perform the role of
the special master. For a full discussion of the role of the special master
see Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
452 (1958).
55

Id.

56 FED.

R. Civ. P. 53.

5-352 U.S. 249 (1956). The court considered the fact that the judge
trying the case had heard matters of discovery and pretrial motions to dismiss, and had a good working knowledge of the antitrust field.
58 This term has been defined on an ad hoc basis. Note 54 supra at 445.
59 The TPO court cited further authority from the seventh circuit to
support the hazy ruling. See Adventures in Good Eating Inc. v. Best Place
To Eat Inc., 131 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1942). In re Irving Austin Bldg. Corp.,
100 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1938). See also Kaufman, Masters in Federal Court:
Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1958).
CO Note 4 at 355, supra.
(1 Id. (emphasis added).
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tuted the word "assistance. ' 62 The TPO court recognized this
omission as a significant change, since the prior draft had implied a delegation of power too broad in scope to be exercised
by a magistrate.63 The substitution of the word "assistance"

was indicative of the fact, the court determined, that the power
to adjudicate should remain solely with the district court
judge. 14 The cumulative effect of TPO's analysis was a finding that Congress, in enacting the Magistrate's Act, had never
intended to expand the role of the magistrate to areas exclusively adjudicatory.
TPO ANALYSIS - SOME SHORTCOMINGS
In reaching its holding, the TPO court adhered strictly to

the merits of the case, and left no room for dicta, concluding:
We need not speculate in regard to what civil functions the magistrate can constitutionally perform, however, since Congress carefully intended that in regard to civil cases the magistrate was not
empowered to exercise ultimate adjudicating or decision making.6 5

Despite this succinct admonition of the court, speculation
becomes more acute in light of the language of the statute, since
the reference provision uses the statutorily defined term, "pretrial proceeding."6
The statute provides that in "a pretrial
proceeding" consideration should be given to "such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action." Accepting
the definition of pretrial proceeding as "all judicial proceedings before trial," 67 such would certainly constitute a part of
the assistance function of the magistrate. However, in light of
TPO, the term "pretrial proceeding" in the Act is to be strictly
construed.
In its analysis, the TPO court suggested further possible
62

Id.

Hearings on S. 945, note 41 supra at 214. In connection with pretrial
proceedings conducted by a magistrate differing views were expressed.
Judge Hoffman of the Eastern District of Virginia felt that the civil plenary
hearings should be conducted by the magistrate with a referral report given
to the district court to enter a final order. Judge Leven felt that it was
necessary for a full understanding of the trial that pretrial proceedings
be conducted by the judge handling the case.
64 Fede'al Magistrate Act Senate Report No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 26-27. The court's conclusion was supported by the Senate subcommittee
report which stated:
Your committee wishes to emphasize that this provision (referring to
the delegation provision) of
e act permitting assignments to magistrates cannot be read in derogation to the fundamental responsibility
of judges to decide the cases before them; instead it contemplates
assignments to magistrates under circumstances where the ultimate
decision of the case is reserved to the judge except in those instances
where action can properly be taken by a non-article III judge.
65 Note 4 supra at 359.
66 FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
67 In re Plumbing Fixture cases 298 F Supp. 484 at 493-9 1. The court
defined a pretrial proceeding: "The easy answer to this contention is
probably the best one, namely, that pretrial, as an adjective, means before
trial -- that all judicial proceedings before trial are pretrial proceedings.
63
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limitations upon the magistrate's civil power. Relying on the
LaBuy holding, the court emphasized that the adjudicatory
function should remain with the district court judge, and that
statutes or court rules, whose construction may limit the power
of the magistrate, will be broadly construed.
TPO -

NEW APPROACH

In an attempt to limit this possible "speculation," the
seventh circuit recently amended the local rules for the Northern District of Illinois.68 In regard to the magistrate's civil
function, the new rules provide that he could
[Assist] district judges in the conduct of pretrial proceedings including, but not limited to the holding of pretrial conferences, the
hearing and consideration of all motions relating to discovery under
Rules 26-37, and the hearing and consideration of other appropriate
specially assigned pretrial motions. In addition the magistrate may
prepare and submit recommended preliminary and final pretrial
orders.
The rule indicates that a magistrate may be able to accomplish
indirectly and constitutionally what had been held to be unconstitutionally done in TPO. Hearings and considerations of appropriate specially assigned pretrial motions leave the nature
of such hearings open to such questions as whether they are to
be purely fact-finding or evidenciary, and in what situation a
magistrate will issue a final order. Given TPO, it would appear
that such hearings might be merely fact-finding. The rule,
generally, still appears to leave the role of the magistrate uncertain.
VIEW OF OTHER DISTRICT COURTS

The Magistrate Act has not yet been subjected to a sufficient amount of interpretative litigation to clarify the magistrate's function in the federal judicial system. In the criminal area, only three recent decisions appear to have considered
the magistrate's judicial power, and in the civil area, only one.
In United States v. Simpson,69 the court, while denying the
defendant's petition to vacate his sentence, spoke of the approach taken by the federal courts to insure appropriate justice
by guaranteeing proper evidenciary hearings for post-trial
habeas corpus petitions."' Speaking of the federal magistrate's
role, ' the court stated that, at a minimum, the federal magistrate may become a means for: defining issues in cases to be
1;sGeneral Order United States District Court (7th Cir., July 17, 1972).
6' 436 F.2d 162, (D.C. Cir. 1970).
70 28 U.S.C. §2255 (1948).
71 A magistrate may assist in such hearings.
See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)
(1970).
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heard by the judge; identifying cases that can be disposed of
without a hearing; and, perhaps, clarifying applicable principles
72
and securing voluntary withdrawal of non-meritorious cases.
73
The court in United States ex rel. Mayberry v. Yeager
considered the reference provision and the magistrate's role
respecting that provision, stating:
Distinction is made in practice, of course, between a hearing held
for arguments of counsel on questions
of law and a plenary hearing
74
to resolve disputed issues of fact.
In United States v. Assenza, 0 the court considered the
magistrate's power to conduct preliminary hearings.76
In
answer to the defendant's contention that the district court
should reverse the magistrate's interlocutory order, the court
held that the defendant should have first requested the magistrate to reverse his own order. The court noted: "[t]he office
of United States magistrate was established by Congress for
the purpose of expediting the work of the federal district court,
'
not for the purpose of duplicating it. 7
Although not passing on the merits of the reference provision, the fifth circuit approved the use of the reference provision in Givens v. W. T. Grant.7 8 Givens involved an action
under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act on an alleged
usurious contract. Pursuant to the reference provision, the
district court referred the case to a federal magistrate and
adopted his recommended decision to dismiss the class action
suit. The appellate court, in affirming the lower court's decision, commended the district court for the utilization of the
9
magistrate through the reference provision.7
The procedure followed in Givens, of having the magistrate
merely recommend the decision and the district court judge actually enter the order, differed from that used in TPO since that
order of dismissal was entered directly by the magistrate.8 0 This
procedure appears to have been adopted by the district court's
new rule"' and, moreover, may be an approach that would avoid
constitutional conflict.
CONCLUSION
Some observations can be made regarding the Magistrate
72 Note 65 supra at 169.
73 321 F. Supp. 199 (N.J.

1971).
74Id. at 201 n.1.
75F. Supp. 1057 (N.D. Fla. 1972).
76 18 U.S.C. §3060 (1948).
77Note 71 supra at 1059.
7s 457 F.2d 612 (2nd Cir. 1972).
,9Id. n.1 at 613.
so Note 4 supra at 348.

81Note 64 supra.
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Act in light of the TPO decision. First, the weight of authority
substantially supports the legal conclusion of the court. Second, regardless of the validity of the holding, the court's refusal to speculate on the civil role of the magistrate leaves that
function subject to conjecture and judicial inquiry. Further,
the statute itself has not been the object of any extensive
scrutiny by the other district courts. Yet, the TPO decision,
and those decisions of the federal court which have interpreted
the statute, uniformly hold that the adjudicatory function
should remain vested in the hands of the district court judge.
The court should not be severely criticized for leaving
the role of the magistrate in the civil area so ambiguous.
Congress, in the passage of this Act, implied a broad goal:
creation of a more efficient federal court system through the
implementation of the federal magistrate. Although Congress
had recognized the existence of the constitutional issue, it has
done little to safeguard against a constitutional violation, except
in the area of the magistrate's minor offense jurisdiction. If by
the lack of safeguards it is to be inferred that the magistrate
should not be a tool of efficiency in federal civil litigation, the
Act itself loses meaning.
The magistrate as a judicial official exists today in a
period of increasing federal litigation, and could be extremely
effective in handling this increased litigation. Congress perhaps should reconsider the portions of the Act discussed in this
article. If it intended a more expansive role for the magistrate,
new legislation should be considered in light of the limitation
expressed in TPO, creating a lower federal tribunal that functions within the maximum limits of the constitution.
Robert F. Quinn

